Resolving the Threat of Ambiguity by Defining a Threat to Violate the Fourth Amendment under \u3ci\u3eKentucky v. King\u3c/i\u3e by LoGalbo, Christopher
Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 78 | Issue 4 Article 7
2013
Resolving the Threat of Ambiguity by Defining a
Threat to Violate the Fourth Amendment under
Kentucky v. King
Christopher LoGalbo
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law Review
by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Christopher LoGalbo, Resolving the Threat of Ambiguity by Defining a Threat to Violate the Fourth Amendment under Kentucky v. King, 78












Resolving the Threat of Ambiguity by 
Defining a Threat to Violate the 
Fourth Amendment under Kentucky v. 
King 
INTRODUCTION 
It is 9:00 P.M. you just got home from work and are 
about to enjoy a late dinner with your family. You join your 
family at the dinner table and strike up conversation with your 
daughter as she eagerly tells you about what happened today 
at school. Suddenly, she is interrupted by the ear-piercing 
screech of car tires on the street outside. You jump up and look 
out the window. It is dark, but you can see the silhouette of a 
man in a hooded jacket as he sprints across your front lawn, 
hops your fence, and disappears into the night. His car is left 
behind: the headlights are on, the engine is running, and the 
driver’s door is wide open. A trail of swerving skid marks leads 
to the car’s resting place: two tires remain on the street, and 
the other two are dug into the dirt on your front lawn. Panic 
sets in as you lock the bolt to the front door.  
You return to the table, but as you sit down, the sound 
of approaching sirens and the glow of flashing lights fill the 
room. Seconds later, you hear the sound of people rushing 
toward your front door . . . Bang! Bang! Bang! Someone slams 
on the door, and a man screams, “Police! Police! Police!” You sit 
still and remain silent. You have never talked to a police officer 
before, and you are terrified. Another man screams, “We know 
you’re in there! Open up or else!” You do not know what “open 
up or else” really means, but you know that these officers 
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sound angry as they pound on your door. At this point, have 
the police threatened to enter your home?  
You then look out the window and see another officer 
running toward your home with a large door-breaching 
battering ram. You hear the distinct sound of metal-on-metal 
as the ram is placed up against your door. An officer yells, “We 
know you’re in there, this is your last chance!” You do not know 
what it is your “last chance” for, but you know that battering 
ram can break down your door in a matter of seconds. At this 
point, have the police threatened to enter your home? What 
statements are sufficient to be considered a threat to enter? 
Can a threat be implied, or must a threat be explicitly clear?  
These are crucial questions both for law enforcement 
officers and for citizens who may be subject to police search. 
Since the Supreme Court decided Kentucky v. King, lower 
courts across the country have struggled to apply its holding 
regarding threatened Fourth Amendment violations.1 This note 
will seek to provide clarity to that issue.  
Kentucky v. King addressed a dramatic circuit split 
regarding the doctrine of “police-created exigencies” and its 
application to warrantless searches and seizures.2 To 
understand the complex puzzle that the Court attempted to 
piece together in King, we must begin with a brief explanation 
of the puzzle’s individual pieces. The Constitution grants 
citizens protection for their “legitimate expectations of privacy”3 
  
 1 Compare United States v. Estrada, No. 1:11-CR-101 TS, 2012 WL 2367992, 
at *6 (D. Utah June 21, 2012) (finding that police officers’ attempt to enter hotel room 
with a key card constituted a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment), with People v. 
Cervantes, No. A131298, 2012 WL 2055106, at *2, *5-6 (Cal. Ct. App. June 8, 2012) 
(holding that police officers did not impermissibly threaten to violate the Fourth 
Amendment by banging loudly on defendant’s door and using key to enter). 
 2 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (No. 09-
1272), 2010 WL 1626437. The Petition states:  
This Court has carved out exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement, but has never determined whether police can create the exigent 
circumstances then used to justify a warrantless entry under those 
exceptions. As a consequence, the lower courts have been debating the issue 
for over forty years, resulting in a dramatic split among the circuits and an 
improper narrowing of the exceptions. 
Id. at *9 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  
 3 Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983). In determining whether an 
individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy, the Court applies a two part test: (1) 
the individual must exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy; and (2) that expectation 
is one that society views as objectively reasonable. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). For a list of police conduct that has been held 
to not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, see Dana Raigrodski, Reasonableness 
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within the home.4 The Fourth Amendment protects these 
expectations by “safeguard[ing] the privacy and security of 
individuals against arbitrary invasions by government 
officials.”5 These safeguards, including the general requirement 
that police must obtain a warrant before searching a home,6 are 
a means of ensuring that searches are “authorized by law 
and . . . limited in . . . scope.”7  
Over the years, the Court has carved out several limited 
exceptions to the warrant requirement that enable the 
government to conduct warrantless searches of the home.8 These 
exceptions (called “exigent circumstances”) recognize the reality 
that the needs of law enforcement may be “so compelling that [a] 
warrantless search is objectively reasonable.”9 These exceptions 
come at a price, however, as they shift discretion away from an 
impartial judge and place it directly in the hands of law 
enforcement in the field.10 As a result, defendants occasionally 
  
and Objectivity: A Feminist Discourse of the Fourth Amendment, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & 
L. 153, 160-62 (2008).  
 4 The protection of privacy within the home is “at the core of the Fourth 
Amendment.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612 (1999); see Craig M. Bradley, “Knock 
and Talk” and the Fourth Amendment, 84 IND. L.J. 1099, 1100-04 (2009). Bradley 
argues that the Court has historically placed special emphasis on Fourth Amendment 
protections within the home. Bradley states that the “concern for privacy in the home 
is, of course, at the root of the Fourth Amendment itself.” Id. at 1101. 
 5 Camara v. Mun. Court of City and Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
 6 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856; Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990).  
 7 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1989) (noting that 
the warrant requirement ensures that the search is not a “random or arbitrary” 
intrusion by the government).  
 8 See, e.g., Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009) (concluding that a 
warrantless entry is justified to give aid when police found property damage and blood, 
and observed a man inside a home yelling); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 
(2006) (concluding that a warrantless entry is justified “to prevent the imminent 
destruction of evidence”); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (concluding that 
a warrantless entry is justified to render emergency aid to an individual in need); 
United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 38-39 (1976) (concluding that a warrantless 
entry is justified when the police are in “hot pursuit” of a suspect). 
 9 Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals only 
from unreasonable searches and seizures, not a warrantless search in general. See U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV. Therefore, under a legitimate exigent circumstance, a warrantless 
search does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures because the search has become objectively reasonable under the 
circumstances. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394.  
 10 This concern arises because of the “importance of informed, detached and 
deliberate determinations” as to whether a search is reasonable. Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (discussing the search of one’s own body); see 
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 221-22 (1981) (“In the absence of exigent 
circumstances, we have consistently held that such judicially untested determinations 
are not reliable enough to justify an entry into a person’s home to arrest him without a 
warrant . . . .”); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1964) (“An evaluation of the 
constitutionality of a search warrant should begin with the rule that ‘the informed and 
deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants . . . are to be 
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accuse law enforcement of improperly creating or 
manufacturing the circumstances that lead to the exigency as a 
means to circumvent the warrant requirement.11 
To curb the risk of abuse of the exigent-circumstance 
doctrine, courts across the nation adopted the police-created 
exigency doctrine.12 This doctrine precludes application of the 
exigent-circumstance doctrine, which serves to render a 
warrantless search of a home objectively reasonable, when the 
exigency that justified the warrantless search resulted from 
actions taken by law enforcement and not the free will of the 
suspect.13 Thus, if the police created the exigency, then the 
exigent-circumstance exception to the warrant requirement is 
inapplicable and the search violated the Fourth Amendment. 
  
preferred over the hurried action of officers . . . who may happen to make arrests.’” 
(quoting United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932) (alterations in original)); 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (“[The Fourth Amendment’s] 
protection consists in requiring that [inferences from evidence] be drawn by a neutral 
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferretting out crime.”). For further information regarding the 
potential issues with evading the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, see 
Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the 
Warrant Requirement Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531 (1997). 
Holly notes that both the Supreme Court and the U.S. Congress have “eroded the warrant 
requirement” of the Fourth Amendment by “weaken[ing] . . . restrictions on the power of the 
government to [enter a citizen’s home] without a warrant.” Id. at 532. Holly refers to the 
erosion of the warrant requirement as a “frontal assault upon Fourth Amendment rights,” 
and warns that the shift away from strict Fourth Amendment protections jeopardizes the 
security of citizens from “overzealous and arbitrary police action.” Id. at 534. Holly argues 
that the Court should enforce a strict “warrant requirement and examine warrantless 
searches with strict scrutiny.” Id. at 540.  
 11 In these instances, victims of an alleged improper warrantless search or 
seizure claim that the conduct of law enforcement officials, not the conduct of the 
occupant, prompted the warrantless search. See, e.g., United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 
361 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding police officers impermissibly created the exigency where the 
officers repeatedly knocked on the accused’s hotel room door under false pretenses and 
then entered the room without a warrant after announcing themselves as police 
officers and hearing rustling and toilet flushing). 
 12 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1857 (2011) (citing United States v. 
Chambers, 395 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 590 
(5th Cir. 2004) (en banc); United States v. Duchi, 906 F.2d 1278, 1284 (8th Cir. 1990)). 
 13 Id. As the Court explained,  
Under [the police-created exigency] doctrine, police may not rely on the 
[exigent circumstance] when that exigency was “created” or “manufactured” 
by the conduct of the police. See, e.g., United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 
563, 566 (C.A.6 2005) (“[F]or a warrantless search to stand, law enforcement 
officers must be responding to an unanticipated exigency rather than simply 
creating the exigency for themselves”); United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 
590 (C.A.5 2004) (en banc) (“[A]lthough exigent circumstances may justify a 
warrantless probable cause entry into the home, they will not do so if the 
exigent circumstances were manufactured by the agents” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
Id. 
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Prior to Kentucky v. King, several Circuit Courts of Appeals 
across the nation agreed that the police-created exigency 
doctrine required a showing of “something more than mere proof 
that fear of detection by the police caused the [exigency].”14 The 
circuits differed, however, on how they applied the doctrine.15 
This circuit split prompted the Court to grant certiorari in 
Kentucky v. King.16  
The Supreme Court decided Kentucky v. King on May 
16, 2011.17 The Court attempted to balance the need for 
investigative efficiency with the protections of citizens’ Fourth 
Amendment privacy rights18 and held that the exigent-
circumstance doctrine “applies when the police do not gain entry 
to premises by means of an actual or threatened violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.”19 Therefore, a warrantless search is 
  
 14 Id. 
 15 Compare King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649, 656 (Ky. 2010) 
(adopting the following two-part test: (1) “courts must determine ‘whether the officers 
deliberately created the exigent circumstances with the bad faith intent to avoid the 
warrant requirement;’” and (2) where police have not acted in bad faith, courts must 
determine “‘[w]hether, regardless of good faith, it was reasonably foreseeable that the 
investigative tactics employed by the police would create the exigent circumstances 
relied upon to justify a warrantless entry.’ If so, then the exigent circumstances cannot 
justify the warrantless entry.” (citations omitted)), and Mann v. State, 161 S.W.3d 826, 
834 (Ark. 2004) (in adopting a foreseeability test, the Supreme Court of Arkansas 
stated “[w]hether, regardless of good faith, it was reasonably foreseeable that the 
investigative tactics employed by the police would create the exigent circumstances 
relied upon to justify a warrantless entry”), with Gould, 364 F.3d at 590 (stating the 
test as (1) “whether the officers deliberately created the exigent circumstances with the 
bad faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement”; and (2) “even if they did not do so 
in bad faith, whether their actions creating the exigency were sufficiently unreasonable 
or improper as to preclude dispensation with the warrant requirement”), Ewolski v. 
City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 504 (6th Cir. 2002) (simply requiring some showing of 
police conduct indicating an intent to avoid the warrant requirement), United States v. 
Duchi, 906 F.2d 1278, 1284 (8th Cir. 1990) (requiring an inquiry into “the 
reasonableness and propriety of the investigative tactics that generated the exigency,” 
and rejecting the requirement that the police officers acted in “bad faith”), and United 
States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 772 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that law enforcement 
officials “do not impermissibly create the exigency” so long as the officials “act in an 
entirely lawful manner”). 
 16 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 61 (2010) (granting certiorari in part).  
 17 King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011). 
 18 Id. at 1862. When deciding whether warrantless entry is justified, the 
Court essentially balances the privacy rights granted by the Fourth Amendment with 
the need for investigative efficiency. In Mincey v. Arizona, for example, the Court noted 
that the investigation of a crime would be simple if warrants were not required; 
however, the Fourth Amendment reflects the view that the privacy of an individual’s 
home may not be completely disregarded for the sake of “maximum simplicity in 
enforcement of the criminal law.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978); see also 
Steven B. Dow, “Step Outside, Please”: Warrantless Doorway Arrests and the Problem of 
Constructive Entry, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 7, 8-10 (2010) (noting that the 
“reasonableness” requirement of the Fourth Amendment requires the balancing of an 
individual’s privacy rights and “the interest of the public in effective law enforcement”). 
 19 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862 (emphasis added). 
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impermissible when law enforcement violates, or threatens to 
violate, the Fourth Amendment “prior to the exigency.”20  
This note argues that the rule in Kentucky v. King is 
fatally vague. A long line of case law defines how law 
enforcement may actually violate the Fourth Amendment,21 yet 
the Court has never defined how law enforcement can threaten 
to violate the Fourth Amendment.22 This note argues that the 
proper test for analyzing an alleged threatened violation should 
place reasonableness—a core justification for the exigent 
circumstance doctrine23—at the heart of the analysis. This test 
fills the gaps in Kentucky v. King by accounting for both explicit 
and implied threats and determines that a threat can be implied 
through words, conduct, or a combination of both.  
Part I of this note provides a brief overview of the 
Fourth Amendment, exigent circumstances, and the police-
created exigency doctrine. Part II discusses the facts and 
holding of Kentucky v. King, paying specific attention to the 
Court’s analysis and reasoning. Part III exposes the ambiguity 
of the scope of a threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment 
in Kentucky v. King. Part IV discusses the distinction between 
an actual and a threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment 
and proposes that the lower courts should adopt an objective 
reasonableness approach in defining the scope of a threatened 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Part V argues that the test 
proposed in Part IV flows directly from Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, adheres to the Court’s holding in Kentucky v. 
King, and resolves some of the Court’s primary concerns 
surrounding the doctrine.  
  
 20 Id. at 1863 (emphasis added) (holding that a warrantless search was 
justified “[b]ecause the officers . . . did not violate or threaten to violate the Fourth 
Amendment prior to the exigency”).  
 21 For a description of an “actual” violation of the Fourth Amendment, see 
infra Part IV.A. 
 22 See generally King, 131 S. Ct. 1849. Justice Alito’s opinion did not set out 
clear guidelines for determining whether a threatened violation of the Fourth 
Amendment is present; the opinion contained merely one additional example:  
[The officers’] conduct was entirely consistent with the Fourth Amendment, 
and we are aware of no other evidence that might show that the officers 
either violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened to do so (for example, by 
announcing that they would break down the door if the occupants did not 
open the door voluntarily). 
Id. at 1863. 
 23 Id. at 1856 (holding that the exigent-circumstance doctrine attaches when 
the circumstances make the “needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] 
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (alteration 
in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394 )). 
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More specifically, this note proposes that in applying 
Kentucky v. King, the lower courts should employ a test I refer 
to as the “Reasonably Interpreted Threat test.” The Reasonably 
Interpreted Threat test states that a threat to violate the Fourth 
Amendment includes (1) any assertion by a government official 
(through words or conduct), (2) that expresses an intent to act in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, (3) when viewed 
objectively24 under the totality of the circumstances. The 
Reasonably Interpreted Threat test accounts for explicit and 
implied threats to violate the Fourth Amendment,25 thus 
rebutting a potential interpretation of the Court’s holding in 
Kentucky v. King. This note argues that the Reasonably 
Interpreted Threat test is consistent with Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence because it preserves the reasonableness 
requirement—the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment”26—and 
adopts the Court’s preference for purely objective review.27  
This note focuses on the meaning of a “threatened 
violation” of the Fourth Amendment in the context of the home 
and deals only with one exigent circumstance: the prevention of 
the imminent destruction of evidence.28 This note does not 
address the conduct of the victim of the alleged Fourth 
Amendment violation, nor does it address whether that conduct 
  
24 “Objectively” in this instance means without regard to the subjective intentions or 
state of mind of law enforcement. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (9th ed. 2009) 
(defining objective as “[o]f, relating to, or based on externally verifiable phenomena, as 
opposed to an individual’s perceptions, feelings, or intentions.”). 
 25 For the definition of an implied threat within the context of this note, see 
infra note 99. For a description of how the test accounts for implied threats, see infra 
Part IV.B. 
 26 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (citing Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)).  
 27 See generally Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011). While analyzing 
the approaches adopted by the circuit courts, Justice Alito articulated many issues 
associated with subjective components. For example, when discussing the subjective 
bad faith standard, Justice Alito noted that the Court has never held that “outside 
limited contexts . . . an officer’s motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior 
under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1859 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 
806, 812 (1996)). Justice Alito stated that “a reasonable foreseeability test would also 
introduce an unacceptable degree of unpredictability” that would be plagued with 
difficulty for both the courts and law enforcement officials alike. Id. Moreover, Justice 
Alito notes that a good investigative tactics “approach fails to provide clear guidance 
for law enforcement officers . . . .” Id. at 1861; see also Eric F. Citron, Right and 
Responsibility in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence: The Problem With Pretext, 116 
YALE L.J. 1072, 1077-76 (2007) (noting that an objective approach has been “at the 
heart” of Fourth Amendment cases for the past two decades, and that the Court refuses 
to look into the subjective intent of law enforcement).  
 28 See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (recognizing the 
prevention of imminent destruction of evidence as a valid exigency exception to the 
warrant requirement).  
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was sufficient to invoke the exigency; rather, this note only aims 
to address the conduct of law enforcement and its role in the 
police-created exigency doctrine.  
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKDROP  
In the 1943 case West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette,29 Justice Jackson stated, “[t]he very purpose of a 
Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the 
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal 
principles to be applied by the courts.”30 In doing so, “[o]ne’s 
right to life, liberty, and property . . . and other fundamental 
rights may not be submitted to vote[.]”31 One subject withdrawn 
from the “vicissitudes of political controversy” is the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection against “unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”32 This right, however, has been a topic of great debate 
in the courts, challenging legal minds for decades.33  
The Fourth Amendment has its roots in a line of 
English common law that recognized an individual’s home as 
“his castle,”34 irrespective of how extravagant or decrepit that 
home may have been.35 In preserving this notion, the Court has 
  
 29 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 30 Id. at 638. 
 31 Id.  
 32  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated . . . .”). 
 33 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809 (2004). Kerr 
states that scholars have “describe[d] Fourth Amendment law as unruly,” with few 
principles that are actually agreed upon. Id. Kerr states that “trying to understand the 
Fourth Amendment is a bit like trying to put together a jigsaw puzzle with several 
incorrect pieces: no matter which way you try to assemble it, a few pieces won’t fit.” Id.  
 34 Semayne’s Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 196 (Q.B.) (“That the house of 
every one is to him as his Castle and Fortress, as well for his defense against injury 
and violence, as for his repose.”); see also Evan B. Citron, Say Hello and Wave Goodbye: 
The Legitimacy of Plain View Seizures at the Threshold of the Home, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2761, 2779 (2006). Citron notes that the idea of affording substantial protection to 
the home was “established as early as 1604,” and that “[t]he precept that a man’s house 
is his castle is one of the oldest and most deeply rooted principles in Anglo-American 
jurisprudence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Citron also notes that the 
“sacred and special nature” of residential privacy “was of critical importance to the 
founders.” Id.  
 35 Dow, supra note 18, at 8. 
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the 
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the 
storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England cannot enter—
all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.  
 
2013] DEFINING A THREAT 1495 
identified that the Fourth Amendment creates a supreme zone 
of privacy36 “free from unreasonable government intrusion.”37 As a 
result, the Court has drawn a “firm line” at the entrance of the 
home,38 requiring that a warrant “generally” must be obtained to 
conduct a search.39 The Court presumes that warrantless searches 
are “per se unreasonable”40 and treats any search conducted by the 
government as an inherent invasion of privacy.41 
The exigent circumstances doctrine carves out several 
exceptions to the warrant requirement.42 Since the “touchstone 
  
Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 36 See Payton, 445 U.S. at 589 (“The Fourth Amendment protects the 
individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly 
defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s 
home.”). The Court in Payton indicated that “the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm 
line at the entrance to the house,” further illustrating the strong emphasis placed by 
the Court on Fourth Amendment protections within the home. Id. at 590.  
 37 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); see also United 
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (“[P]rivate residences are places in which the 
individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a 
warrant . . . .”); United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) 
(“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed . . . .”). 
 38 Payton, 445 U.S. at 590 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line 
at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not 
reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”).  
 39 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (noting that “although the 
text of the Fourth Amendment does not specify exactly when a warrant must be 
obtained, th[e] Court has inferred that a warrant must generally be secured”); Payton, 
445 U.S. at 576 (1980); see also Investigation and Police Practices, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. 
REV. CRIM. PROC. 3 (Simon Latcovich & Erin Murphy eds., 2006) (noting that, 
“interpreted literally,” the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly require a warrant for 
every search or seizure; however, “the Supreme Court imposes a presumptive warrant 
requirement”).  
 40 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (holding that searches 
“conducted outside the judicial process” are “per se unreasonable”). The Court in 
Acevedo further noted that the warrant requirement is “subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Id. (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 
437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Payton, 445 U.S. 
at 586 (1980) (holding that “a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law” is that 
“searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively 
unreasonable”); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“At the very core 
[of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and 
there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”). 
 41 Investigation and Police Practices, supra note 39, at 5 (2006) (“A search is a 
governmental invasion of a person’s privacy.”).  
 42 See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (noting that 
warrantless entry may be justified “to fight a fire and investigate its cause, to prevent 
the imminent destruction of evidence, or to engage in ‘hot pursuit’ of a fleeing suspect” 
(citations omitted)). The Court in Kentucky v. King recognized the legitimacy of these 
exceptions. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856. For example, the Court indicated that law 
enforcement may enter a home without a warrant to render “emergency aid.” Id. (citing 
Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403). 
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of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,”43 the justification 
behind the exigent circumstances doctrine is that in certain 
instances, “the needs of law enforcement [are] so compelling 
that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable . . . .”44 The 
doctrine is thus a narrowly tailored, Court-created list of 
circumstances that are pre-determined to satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.45 
The exigency at issue in Kentucky v. King was the 
prevention of the imminent destruction of evidence,46 which 
enables the warrantless search of a home upon law enforcement’s 
reasonable belief that the destruction of evidence is imminent.47 
The Court has long recognized the necessity of this exigency48 
because police frequently face “now or never” scenarios49 that 
  
 43 Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (2006).  
 44 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (second alteration in original) (citing Mincey, 437 
U.S. at 394). 
 45 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (1967) (holding that warrantless searches should 
be “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”). It is 
important to note, however, that warrantless searches and seizures conducted under 
the exigent-circumstance doctrine are still subject to review by the courts. A court may 
review a warrantless search or seizure to determine whether or not an exigency 
actually existed, and whether or not the search or seizure was appropriate under the 
circumstances. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1968) (holding that a search must 
be strictly limited to the exigencies of the situation). 
 46 See generally King, 131 S. Ct. 1849. 
 47 See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 
(1963)). The Court has placed several constraints on this exigency before a failure to 
obtain a warrant would be justified. First, the time constraints of obtaining a warrant 
must have been sufficiently burdensome to the investigation. See McDonald v. United 
States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948). In McDonald, the Court noted that the suspect was 
under surveillance by law enforcement for months, and that during this time, a search 
warrant could have been obtained. Id. at 454-55. The Court further remarked that it 
would not allow the “constitutional barrier that protects the privacy of the individual to 
be hurdled so easily.” Id. at 455. Second, a warrantless search will not be justified if the 
police could have taken less intrusive action to prevent the destruction of evidence 
while waiting for a warrant to be issued. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51-
52 (1951) (holding warrantless search was not justified when officers admitted that 
they could have prevented the destruction or removal of evidence by guarding a hotel 
room door and restricting entry); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331-32 (2001) 
(holding that a seizure by guarding the defendant’s home and restricting his entry 
until a warrant was obtained was lawful; the police had probable cause to believe that 
evidence was inside the trailer home, and the police had good reason to believe that, if 
defendant was permitted to enter, he would destroy the evidence). Finally, a 
warrantless search of a home will typically be unjustified where the offense being 
investigated is “minor.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (holding that the 
presumption of unreasonableness of a warrantless search and seizure is particularly 
hard to overcome for minor offenses, and stating that “the gravity of the underlying 
offense” is an important factor to consider). 
 48 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (citing Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403). 
 49 Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 505 (1973) (observing that in “exigent 
circumstances in which police action literally must be ‘now or never’ to preserve the 
evidence of the crime,” warrantless search and seizure is reasonable); see also 
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 (noting that an officer may reasonably believe that, under 
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require quick action to prevent the destruction of tangible 
evidence. Under these circumstances, it would be “foolish” for 
the police to take the time to secure a warrant.50 Because 
tangible evidence is preferable for investigative accuracy,51 the 
Court has justified this exception on the expectation that it 
would result in more guilty individuals being prosecuted and 
more innocent individuals going free.52 Adding to its importance, 
this exigency frequently permits warrantless searches53 in 
narcotics cases because “drugs [can] be easily . . . flush[ed] . . . 
down a toilet or rins[ed] . . . down a drain.”54  
Though well-established in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the destruction of evidence exigency presents 
unique issues under the police-created exigency doctrine that 
troubled the lower courts prior to Kentucky v. King.55 These 
difficulties result from the fact that the police, in some way, 
always create the exigency in destruction of evidence cases,56 
  
the circumstances, “the delay necessary to obtain a warrant . . . threatens the 
destruction of evidence” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 50 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
757, 768 (1994) (“In a wide range of fast-breaking situations—hot pursuits, crimes in 
progress, and the like—a warrant requirement would be foolish. Recognizing this, the 
modern Supreme Court has carved out an ‘exigent circumstances exception’ to its so-
called warrant requirement.”).  
 51 See Note, Police Practices and the Threatened Destruction of Tangible 
Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1465 (1971) (indicating that “tangible evidence has acquired 
a reputation as a trustworthy—and ‘scientific’— method of proving guilt”). The note 
states that there is often a high price to pay for acquiring such tangible evidence: the 
invasion of the security of the home. Id. at 1465. 
 52 Id. (indicating that if law enforcement is forced to turn to less tangible 
forms of evidence, such as witness statements, there is an increased possibility that 
“the innocent will be convicted and the guilty go free”). 
 53 Investigation and Police Practices, supra note 39, at 71-72 (noting that, 
because narcotics may be easily destroyed, narcotic investigations often lead to 
warrantless searches or seizures based on exigent circumstances); see also King, 131 S. 
Ct. at 1857 (“Destruction of evidence issues probably occur most frequently in drug 
cases because drugs may be easily destroyed by flushing them down a toilet or rinsing 
them down a drain.”). 
54 See, e.g., State v. Linder, 190 N.W.2d 91, 92 (Minn. 1971). In Linder, law enforcement 
officials entered an apartment and observed a person run into the bathroom and flush 
the toilet. Id. The officials fished narcotics out of the toilet while it was being flushed. 
Id.; see also Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1857 (2011) (noting that narcotics may 
be “easily destroyed”); Charles Patrick Garcia, Note, The Knock and Announce Rule: A 
New Approach to the Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 702 
(1993) (recognizing the “inherent disposability” of narcotic substances). 
 55 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 56 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1857 (citing United States v. Duchi, 906 F.2d 1278, 
1284 (8th Cir. 1990)). The destruction of evidence exigency is therefore unique in that 
suspects destroy evidence almost always because of police behavior. This is different 
from other exigencies, like the emergency aid exigency, where law enforcement can 
enter a home without a warrant for a multitude of reasons other than those prompted 
mainly by police activity (such as fighting a fire or preventing a suspect from harming 
another individual).  
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given that individuals have little reason to destroy valuable 
narcotics unless attempting to prevent them from “fall[ing] into 
the hands of law enforcement.”57 This dilemma presented the 
courts with the daunting task of drafting a workable test for the 
police-created exigency doctrine that preserves the well-
established destruction of evidence exigency58 while remaining 
capable of determining exactly when the police impermissibly 
manufactured the exigency. As a precondition to invoking the 
police-created exigency doctrine, the lower courts generally 
required a showing of “something more than mere proof that 
fear of detection by the police caused the destruction of 
evidence.”59 The circuit split arose, however, in defining what 
constituted “something more.”60 A clear and workable rule for 
the police-created exigency doctrine was needed, and the Court 
took on this challenge in Kentucky v. King.  
II. KENTUCKY V. KING 
A. The Facts 
In October 2005, police officers set up a “controlled 
buy”61 of narcotics at an apartment complex.62 When the sale at 
issue was complete, several officers received a signal to move in 
and arrest the suspect.63 The officers in pursuit received a 
description of the suspect, whom they were told “entered a 
specific breezeway at the apartment complex.”64 Because there 
  
 57 Id.; see also Grant T. Herrin, O! Say Can You Smell? Drug Smell Test 
Taskforces: Police-Created Exigency Doctrine no Longer a Check on Warrantless Search 
by Police, 39 S.U. L. REV. 343, 358 (“[B]ecause illegal drugs are so valuable but so easily 
disposed of, criminals in possession of drugs will not likely destroy them unless they 
expect the drugs will fall into the hands of the police.”). 
 58 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1857. 
 59 Id. The Court in King noted that if simple causation was sufficient, 
warrantless entry in the destruction of evidence cases would almost always be 
precluded and would thus swallow the exception. Id.  
 60 Id. (“[T]he lower courts have held that the police-created exigency doctrine 
requires more than simple causation, but the lower courts have not agreed on the test 
to be applied.”). For a list of the varying tests for the police-created exigency doctrine 
prior to Kentucky v. King, see supra note 15. 
 61 For a description of a “controlled buy,” see State v. Walker, 444 A.2d 277, 
284 (Del. Super. Ct. 1982) (“A ‘controlled [buy]’ has been defined as ‘providing money to 
a buyer, who is searched before and after making contact with the seller,’ and ‘[i]t also 
involves police surveillance of as much of the transaction between buyer and seller as 
possible.’” (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hawkins, 278 N.W.2d 750, 751 
(Minn. 1979)).  
 62 King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649, 651 (Ky. 2010). 
 63 Id.  
 64 Id.  
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were several apartments in that breezeway, the officers did not 
know which apartment the suspect entered.65 As they entered the 
breezeway, the officers noticed a strong odor of burnt marijuana 
coming from an apartment.66 Believing that the suspect must have 
entered this apartment, “the officers banged on the . . . door ‘as 
loud as [they] could’ and announced, ‘This is the police’ or ‘Police, 
police, police.’”67 The officers then heard people moving inside and 
what sounded like “things . . . being moved inside the 
apartment,”68 which led the officers to believe that the apartment’s 
occupants were destroying evidence.69 As a result, the officers then 
“explained to [the suspects that the police] were going to make 
entry inside the apartment,”70 kicked in the door, and performed a 
“protective sweep” of the apartment.71 They found three people—
including King—and discovered marijuana, cocaine, crack 
cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and money.72 Realizing that the 
respondent was not their original suspect, the officers then 
entered the apartment on the right of the breezeway and located 
the “initial target of their investigation.”73 
B. The Path to the Supreme Court 
Kentucky v. King’s path to the Supreme Court began at 
trial when the respondent filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence obtained during the warrantless search. The Fayette 
County Circuit Court denied the motion, holding that the 
warrantless search was justified under the exigent-circumstance 
  
 65 See id. The Kentucky Supreme Court noted that one officer attempted to 
alert the officers in pursuit that the suspect had entered “the back right apartment;” 
however, the pursuing officers were no longer near their car radio, and never heard 
this message. Id. The pursuing officers simply heard a door “slam shut.” Id.  
 66 Id.  
 67 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1854 (2011) (quoting Joint Appendix at 22-
23, Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011) (No. 09-1272), 2010 WL 4628574, at *22, *23.  
 68 Joint Appendix, supra note 67, at 24. 
 69 Id.  
 70 Id.  
 71 Id. at 25. For a description of a “protective sweep,” see Maryland v. Buie, 
494 U.S. 325, 327, 335 (1990). A “protective sweep” is a search conducted for the 
purpose of protecting the arresting officer. Id. at 335. It is not a complete and 
comprehensive search of a premise; rather, a “protective sweep” is merely a “cursory 
inspection of those spaces where a person may be found.” Id. The search should last no 
longer than the amount of time necessary to “dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger 
and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the 
premises.” Id. at 336. 
 72 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1854 (2011). 
 73 See id. at 1855.  
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doctrine.74 The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit 
court’s ruling on the grounds that the “police reasonably 
believed that evidence would be destroyed”75 and held that the 
police “did not impermissibly create the exigency . . . because 
they did not deliberately evade the warrant requirement.”76 The 
Kentucky Supreme Court reversed, and adopted a two-part test 
to determine when police impermissibly create the exigency.77 
First, the court looked to whether the police created the exigency 
with a bad faith intent of evading the warrant requirement.78 
Second, the court considered whether it was “reasonably 
foreseeable” that the police tactics would create an exigency.79 
The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the police impermissibly 
created the exigency because the destruction of evidence was a 
“reasonably foreseeable” response to the officers’ conduct.80 The 
United States Supreme Court recognized the nationwide conflict 
regarding the police-created exigency doctrine and granted 
certiorari81 to determine when “impermissibly created exigent 
circumstances exist.”82 
C. Analysis and Holding 
The Court recognized the legitimacy of both the 
destruction of evidence exigency83 and the police-created 
exigency doctrine,84 setting out only to determine how these 
doctrines interact.85 Through repetition and emphasis, Justice 
Alito’s majority opinion focused extensively on the question of 
  
 74 Id. The Circuit Court held that the warrantless search was justified 
because the officer’s knocking was unanswered, and the police “heard movement in the 
apartment which he reasonably concluded were persons in the act of destroying evidence, 
particularly narcotics because of the smell.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 75 Id.  
 76 Id. The circuit court essentially applied a bad faith test, requiring the 
officers to deliberately evade the warrant requirement. Id.  
 77  King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.2d 649, 655-57 (Ky. 2010). 
 78 Id. at 656. 
 79 Id.  
 80 Id.  
 81 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 61 (Sept. 
28, 2010) (No. 09-1272) (granting certiorari only to “Question 1” in the petition).  
 82 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (No. 09-1272) 
(2011). Question 1 of the Petition is as follows: “When does lawful police action 
impermissibly ‘create’ exigent circumstances which preclude warrantless entry; and 
which of the five tests currently being used by the United States Courts of Appeals is 
proper to determine when impermissibly created exigent circumstances exist?” Id.  
 83 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)). 
 84 Id. at 1857 (citing United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2005)). 
 85 Id. at 1862-63 (“We decide only the question . . . on which we granted 
certiorari: Under what circumstances do police impermissibly create an exigency?”).  
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reasonableness.86 The proper test for the police-created exigency 
doctrine flows directly from such reasonableness,87 the very 
justification for the exigency doctrine itself.88 Therefore, 
warrantless entry is justified under the exigent circumstance 
doctrine when “the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is 
reasonable in the same sense.”89 The Court held that the “exigent 
circumstances rule applies when the police do not gain entry to 
premises by means of an actual or threatened violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.”90 The Court thus adopted an objective test91 
that requires a showing of more than simple causation,92 placing 
its sole emphasis on the reasonableness of police action prior to 
the exigency.93 
III. AMBIGUITY IN KENTUCKY V. KING: THE MEANING OF A 
“THREATENED VIOLATION” 
The Court purports to have created a workable legal 
standard that provides “ample protection for the privacy rights 
that the [Fourth] Amendment protects.”94 The troubling reality, 
  
 86 Id. at 1856 (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403. The Court noted that 
warrantless searches in the home are presumptively unreasonable; that this 
presumption may be overcome because the “touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 
reasonableness”; and that the warrant requirement is subject to reasonable exceptions. Id. 
 87 See id. at 1858 (indicating that “warrantless searches are allowed when the 
circumstances make it reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to 
dispense with the warrant requirement”).  
 88 See id. at 1857-58 (“Despite the welter of tests devised by the lower courts, 
the answer . . . follows directly and clearly from the principle that permits warrantless 
searches in the first place.”). 
 89 Id. (emphasis added).  
 90 Id. at 1862. 
 91 The test is objective in this context because it does not account for the 
subjective intentions or beliefs of law enforcement.  
 92 Under the Court’s rule, police conduct may still in a way cause the 
exigency; however, more than simple causation is required to show that the exigency 
was impermissibly created by the police. See id. at 1858 (holding that a warrantless 
search is justified when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency was 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). For example, if police smell burning opium 
outside an apartment, and knock on the door, an individual inside may be prompted to 
get up and flush the opium down a toilet. By knocking, the police essentially caused the 
suspect inside to destroy the evidence, yet the police did not impermissibly cause the 
suspect to destroy the evidence because their behavior prior to the destruction was 
reasonable. See id. at 1862 (finding no Fourth Amendment violation when police simply 
knock on a suspect’s door because the police are doing no more than a private citizen 
might do; the occupant does not have to answer the door, and the occupant doesn’t have 
to let the police in). 
 93 After indicating that warrantless searches are justified when the 
circumstances make it reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the Court stated that 
“the exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the 
police preceding the exigency is reasonable . . . .” King, 131 S. Ct. at 1858 (emphasis added).  
 94 Id. at 1862. 
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however, is that the Court failed to clearly define what actually 
constitutes a “threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment.”95 
This ambiguity poses a threat to the very principles that the 
Court sought to protect and uphold. Without a clearer 
understanding of the conduct that invokes the police-created 
exigency doctrine, lower courts and police are left playing a 
guessing game with the constitutionally protected privacy rights 
of our nation’s citizens.  
Despite the ambiguity as to what constitutes a 
“threatened violation,” the Court did provide two simple 
examples of how the test may be applied. The first example 
comes from the Court’s analysis of the facts in Kentucky v. King. 
From this analysis, we know that if police bang on a door “as 
loud as [they] c[an]” and yell “Police, Police, Police,” or “this is 
the Police,” they have not threatened to violate the Fourth 
Amendment.96 By contrast, the Court also observed that a 
threatened Fourth Amendment violation occurs when officers 
“announc[e] that they [will] break down the door if the 
occupants [do] not open the door voluntarily.”97  
In the absence of any clear rule on the meaning of 
“threat,” these two examples offer little guidance for the lower 
courts in determining the scope of a threatened violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.98 This ambiguity is especially troubling as 
lower courts attempt to determine whether a threat to violate 
the Fourth Amendment must be expressly made or whether an 
implied threat99 will suffice.100 The second example provided by 
  
 95 See generally id. Nowhere in the Court’s holding is a “threatened violation 
of the Fourth Amendment” clearly defined. Instead, the Court reiterates that simply 
knocking on the door of a private residence and asking to speak to the people within 
does not constitute such a threat. Id. at 1862; see also Herrin, supra note 57, at 376 (“It 
is clear that the police could act unreasonably should they violate the Fourth 
Amendment with an unlawful search . . . prior to the announcement of their presence. 
However, after announcing their presence, it becomes exponentially difficult to 
determine how and when law enforcement can act unreasonably.” (footnote omitted)). 
 96 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1863 (first alteration in original). The Court stated that 
“[t]his conduct was entirely consistent with the Fourth Amendment.” Id.  
 97 Id.; see also Herrin, supra note 57, at 361 (“[T]he only instance the High 
Court gave when police could violate the Fourth Amendment in this situation was if 
the police had announced they would break down the door if King had not opened it.”).  
 98 The Court failed to indicate whether an implied threat is sufficient, or 
whether the police must expressly threaten to violate the Fourth Amendment. King, 
131 S. Ct. 1849. 
 99  Within the context of this note, an express threat is a clear and explicit 
verbal communication of an unambiguous Fourth Amendment violation. See BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “express” as “[c]learly and unmistakably 
communicated; directly stated”). Likewise, an implied threat is conduct other than 
express verbal communication of a Fourth Amendment violation that can be deemed a 
threat to violate the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 770 (defining “implied” as “[n]ot 
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the Court deals only with an explicit threat, given that 
breaking down a door would clearly result in a Fourth 
Amendment violation where no exigency exists.101 The Court 
does not, however, address the applicability of implied threats 
under their rule. On its face, the rule itself appears to permit 
implied threats simply because it does not exclude them.102 On 
the contrary, the Court suggested an unwillingness to account 
for implied threats by rejecting the respondent’s proposed test, 
which would have accounted for tone of voice and forcefulness 
of knocks in determining whether the police created the 
exigency.103 As the smoke from this constitutional battle clears, 
  
directly expressed”). For examples of potential implied threats, see 3 WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.5(b) (5th 
ed. 2012). LaFave suggests that a threat may be implied when police bang on a door, 
announce their presence, and then state “we know you’ve got drugs in there” or “we 
want to search your apartment.” Id. LaFave also suggests that “persistent banging” 
and announcing “This is the police” over an extended period of time may be sufficient to 
constitute a threat. Id. 
 100 See id. LaFave takes note of the ambiguity inherent in Kentucky v. King, 
especially when attempting to determine how “specific” a threat must be to constitute a 
threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. LaFave notes that the Court’s 
opinion in King “leaves plenty of room for mischief” among the lower courts in 
determining the scope of a threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. Rachel 
Levick specifically questioned this ambiguity, stating that “[w]here police implicitly 
demand entry to a home, the doctrine does not make clear whether the resulting exigency 
would be police-created or not . . . .” Rachel Levick, Note, “Knock, Listen, Then Break the 
Door Down”? The Police-Created Exigency Doctrine After Kentucky v. King, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. PENNUMBRA 1, 17 (2012), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/notes/09-
2012/Levick.pdf.  
 101 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1863 (providing the following example of a threat to 
violate the Fourth Amendment: “announcing [prior to the exigency] that [the police] 
would break down the door if the occupants did not open the door voluntarily”). 
 102 The Court’s rule simply includes “threatened,” without any explicit 
mention of the type of the threat required. Id. at 1862 (“[T]he exigent circumstances 
rule applies when the police do not gain entry to premises by means of an actual or 
threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment.”). By omitting a requirement that a 
threat must be expressly made, it appears as if an implied threat would suffice. See 
LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 6.5(b) (“Given the emphasis in King on occupants’ 
entitlement to stand on their constitutional rights, one would think that even implied 
threats would suffice.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 103 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1861 (rejecting the respondent’s test, which proposed 
that police “impermissibly create an exigency when they engage in conduct that would 
cause a reasonable person to believe that entry is imminent and inevitable” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). Under the respondent’s proposed test, the “officers’ tone of 
voice” and “the forcefulness of their knocks” would be relevant factors. Id. The Court 
rejected this approach because police may have good reason to knock and announce 
their presence loudly enough so that occupants are alerted as to their presence. Id. In 
addition, the Court determined that this test would propose difficulty for both officers 
in the field deciding “how loudly they may knock or announce their presence or how 
forcefully they may knock,” and for lower courts “determin[ing] whether th[e] threshold 
has been passed.” Id.  
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we are left with a vague and contradictory view of the Court’s 
holding that leaves significant room for interpretation.104  
IV. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF A THREATENED VIOLATION OF 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Kentucky v. King recognizes an inherent distinction 
between an actual and a threatened violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.105 To determine how an officer may threaten to 
violate the Fourth Amendment, we first must address how an 
officer may actually violate the Fourth Amendment.106 
A. Actual Violation of the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment condemns any warrantless 
search of a home,107 which the courts have treated as per se 
unreasonable.108 This presumption can be overcome, however, if 
  
 104 LAFAVE, supra note 99, at § 6.5(b). Regarding the meaning of a threatened 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, LaFave noted that “King unquestionably leaves 
plenty of room for mischief.” Id.  
 105 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862 (holding that the exigent-circumstance 
doctrine “applies when the police do not gain entry to premises by means of an actual 
or threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment” (emphasis added)).  
 106 This note focuses solely on Fourth Amendment violations within the 
context of the home, and assumes that there is a legitimate expectation of privacy. Yet 
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure are not 
limited to the home owner; the protections extend to anyone who “has a legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) 
(citing, among others, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)). The Court has 
recognized certain scenarios where individuals may have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy outside “their” home, such as an overnight guest in the home of another. See 
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1990). Note, however, that the Fourth 
Amendment protections are not attached to places, they are attached to people. Katz, 
389 U.S. at 351; see also Kerr, supra note 33, at 810 (indicating that renters have 
reasonable expectations of privacy in a rented home or apartment, and that similar 
protections apply to hotel rooms and storage lockers). Therefore, even though this note 
focuses solely on the home, Fourth Amendment protections do not solely depend on the 
location of the individual—they apply when “the person invoking its protection can 
claim a justifiable, a reasonable, or a legitimate expectation of privacy that has been 
invaded by government action.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 107 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (“Unreasonable searches or 
seizures conducted without any warrant at all are condemned by the plain language of 
the first clause of the [Fourth] Amendment.”). 
 108 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991) (holding that searches and 
seizures “conducted outside the judicial process” are “per se unreasonable”). Although 
this note does not address the issue of consent, a warrantless search may be conducted 
if consent is given. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is . . . well 
settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a 
warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent.”). 
Consent must be freely given such that it is not “coerced, by explicit or implicit means, 
by implied threat or covert force.” Id. at 228. 
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a legitimate exigent circumstance exists109 that renders a 
“warrantless search . . . objectively reasonable.”110 Absent such 
circumstances, then, a warrantless search and seizure results 
in an actual violation of the Fourth Amendment111 by the 
government112 and thereby infringes a constitutionally 
recognized expectation of privacy.113 
An actual violation is “fully accomplished” upon the 
initial “unjustified governmental invasion” of a person’s 
privacy;114 nevertheless, such invasions may occur under many 
different circumstances. An unreasonable search may be 
conducted during the classic physical search, where the police 
physically enter a home and conduct a search in person.115 An 
unreasonable search might also arise from the use of 
technology that exposes “the details of the home,” without 
  
 109 For further information regarding legitimate exigent circumstances, see 
supra notes 8 and 42.  
 110 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S 385, 394 (1978). 
 111 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated . . . .” (emphasis added)); Payton, 445 U.S. at 584. In Payton, the Court 
recognized that the Fourth Amendment has “two separate clauses, the first protecting 
the basic right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and the second 
requiring that warrants be particular and supported by probable cause.” Id. This note 
focuses only on Fourth Amendment violations in the context of unreasonable search 
and seizure—Fourth Amendment violations in the issuing of warrants with probable 
cause are beyond the scope of this analysis. It should be sufficient to note that “[t]he 
Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizures, but only those deemed 
unreasonable.” Raigrodski, supra note 3, at 158 (emphasis added). 
 112 The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable 
searches and seizures by the government—the Amendment does not protect against 
private actions. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1984) (“[The Fourth 
Amendment] is wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, 
effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the 
participation or knowledge of any government official.’” (quoting Walter v. United 
States, 447 U.S. 649, 662 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).  
 113 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(noting in the concurrence that the heart of a Fourth Amendment analysis in 
determining whether an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy is whether a 
person has a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy”). 
 114 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (“The purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment is to prevent unreasonable government intrusions into the 
privacy of one’s person, house, papers, or effects. The wrong condemned is unjustified 
governmental invasion of these areas of an individual’s life. That wrong . . . is fully 
accomplished by the original search without probable cause.”).  
 115 For example, in King, law enforcement officials physically burst down the 
door, physically entered the apartment, and conducted a physical search in person. 
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1863 (2011); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 
U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“[A]ny physical invasion of the structure of the home, ‘by even a 
fraction of an inch,’ [is] too much.” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 
512 (1961))).  
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physically intruding the home.116 (I will refer to such conduct as a 
“constructive search.”) The Court has recognized constructive 
searches in various settings, including the use of infrared thermal 
imaging117 and electronic listening devices,118 and has even 
accounted for new and more sophisticated technologies that may 
be employed in the future.119 
B. Threatened Violation of the Fourth Amendment  
During oral argument before the Court in Kentucky v. 
King, certain justices expressed a concern that the various 
tests adopted by lower courts would not invalidate a 
warrantless search when officers demanded entry prior to the 
  
 116 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (holding that the government’s warrantless use of 
certain sense-enhancing technologies not “in general public use” violated Fourth 
Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure when it exposed 
“details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical 
intrusion”); Silverman, 365 U.S. at 513 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]he command of 
the Fourth Amendment [should not] be limited by nice distinctions turning on the kind 
of electronic equipment employed. Rather our sole concern should be with whether the 
privacy of the home was invaded.”); see also Kerr, supra note 33, at 804. Kerr indicates 
that the concern of technology’s impact on privacy rights dates back to 1928 when 
Justice Brandeis declared that “every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon 
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Kerr further notes that the view that the 
Fourth Amendment should account for advances in technology has been embraced by 
legal theorists, constitutional scholars, and “nearly everyone else who has written on 
the intersection of technology and criminal procedure.” Id.  
 117 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (holding that the use of “Thermovision imaging” 
was a search, and was “presumptively unreasonable without a warrant”).  
 118 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.  
The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the 
petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while 
using the telephone booth and thus constituted a “search and seizure” within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the electronic device 
employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the 
booth can have no constitutional significance. 
Id. 
 119 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36 (“While the technology used in the present case was 
relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems 
that are already in use or in development.”); id. at 40 (“Where . . . the Government uses 
a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would 
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 
‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”). For further 
information regarding the impact of technology on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, 
and for a discussion of the potential future impact of Kyllo on the Fourth Amendment 
regarding the government’s use of technology, see Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo, and 
Technology: Virtual Fourth Amendment Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 
MISS. L.J. 51 (2002). 
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exigency.120 Justice Scalia even noted that an officer who gives 
off the impression that he possesses a warrant and demands 
entry is technically not violating the Fourth Amendment at that 
very moment.121 This concern likely served as the justification 
behind the Court’s inclusion of the “threatened violation” rhetoric 
in the rule, based on a theory that law enforcement should not be 
able to threaten behavior that would be inconsistent with the 
Fourth Amendment even though the assertion itself is not a 
Fourth Amendment violation.122 In other words, the Court 
seemed to recognize that a threatened violation of the Fourth 
Amendment that creates an exigent circumstance ought not to 
excuse the general warrant requirement in the same way that 
a naturally arising exigency would. 
C. The “Reasonably Interpreted Threat Test” 
1. The Test 
Following King, lower courts have been left with the 
task of determining what behavior sufficiently constitutes a 
threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment.123 For the 
reasons stated below, this note proposes that the lower courts 
adopt the “Reasonably Interpreted Threat test.” Under this test, a 
threat to violate the Fourth Amendment includes (1) any 
assertion by a government official (verbal or physical), (2) 
reasonably expressing (3) an intent to act in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment (4) when viewed objectively under the totality 
of the circumstances. This test resolves the ambiguity in King 
regarding the scope of a threatened violation of the Fourth 
  
 120 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 
(2011) (No. 09-1272). In particular, Justice Sotomayor asked, “What if the officers had 
simply knocked, said ‘We’re going to kick the door in if you don’t open it’?” Id. at 15. 
Following a similar threat, Justice Scalia asked, “Is it—is it unlawful? Is—is saying ‘Open 
up, police,’ is that unlawful?” Id. at 33. Later, Justice Scalia asked, “Do you have any doubt 
that it’s unlawful for a police officer to threaten to burst into a home?” Id. at 47.  
 121 Id. at 52 (“It wouldn’t technically be a Fourth Amendment violation, would 
it, if the police gave the impression that they had a warrant and were about to kick in 
the door? Is that a Fourth Amendment violation in and of itself?”) 
 122 See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011); Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 120, at 52. 
 123 See LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 6.5(b) (stating that, post-King, the usual 
question presented to the lower courts will be whether police conduct “deserves to be 
characterized as a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment,” and whether or not a 
threat has to be specific). The Supreme Court left open many questions for the lower 
courts: Can a threat be implied or must it be explicit? What constitutes an implied 
threat? What constitutes an express threat? Must a threat be verbalized, or can a 
threat be express or implied through physical behavior?  
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Amendment124 by treating any assertion—whether verbal or 
physical, implied or express—as such a threat.  
The justification is simple: the reasonableness standard 
used to analyze actual violations of the Fourth Amendment 
should also be used to analyze threatened violations of the 
Fourth Amendment. The only difference in the analysis of an 
actual and threatened violation is one additional step. In 
determining whether law enforcement conducted an actual 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court must decide 
whether an officer (1) engaged in behavior (2) that violates the 
Fourth Amendment. Kentucky v. King added another link to this 
chain: in determining whether law enforcement threatened to 
violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court must decide whether 
they (1) threatened (2) to engage in behavior (3) that violates the 
Fourth Amendment. The Reasonably Interpreted Threat test 
simply isolates the actual behavior alleged to constitute a 
threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment and subjects 
that behavior to its own separate reasonableness analysis.  
2. Explicit and Implied Threats 
The Court’s holding in Kentucky v. King could be 
interpreted to treat only explicit threats as a threatened 
violation, based on the little guidance the Court offered in its 
rejection of the respondent’s test125 and the one example it 
provided.126 But when analyzing the holding, it becomes evident 
that the Court’s rule can and must account for implied and 
explicit threats.127 The Court’s holding explicitly states that the 
  
 124 See supra Part III for further discussion of the ambiguity in the Court’s holding.  
 125 The respondent’s proposed test accounted for implied threats as well as 
explicit threats. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  
 126 The only additional example provided by the Court dealt with an explicit 
threat. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. Seeing that the court rejected the 
respondent’s test accounting for implied threats, and included only one example 
describing an explicit threat, it is likely that academics and lower courts will assume 
that this test applies only to explicit threats—an assumption that this note rebuts. See 
LAFAVE, supra note 99, § 6.5(b). LaFave seems confident that, under the test in King, a 
threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment must be explicit, and he states that the 
determination of whether or not such a threat exists will hinge on “the exact words 
utilized by the police.” Id. 
 127 Several lower courts have already begun to address the issue of implied 
threats; however, no court has tackled the application of implied threats head on. For 
example, in a Tenth Circuit case, the defendant argued that the “show of military 
force . . . clearly implied that if there was no compliance with [the police’s] demands the 
Fourth Amendment would be violated.” United States v. Ramirez-Fragozo, 490 F. 
App’x 125, 128-29 (10th Cir. 2012). The Tenth Circuit did not state that such conduct 
was incapable of constituting a threat; rather, they dismissed this argument on the 
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“exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when 
the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable 
[under the Fourth Amendment],”128 and when police did not create 
the exigency by “threatening to engage in conduct that violates 
the Fourth Amendment.”129 The Court suggests that a 
reasonableness analysis focuses on police conduct preceding the 
exigency (which would include the alleged threat) without any 
distinction made as to the means by which that threat was 
asserted. Thus, certain implied or non-verbal conduct may 
reasonably express a Fourth Amendment violation just as well as 
explicit verbal assertions. For example, if a police officer bangs 
loudly on a door, and yells “open up, or else,” the ambiguity of 
the term “or else” indicates that there is no express threat to 
violate the Fourth Amendment: “or else” may mean “or else I’m 
going to kick the door in” (a threat to violate the Fourth 
Amendment) or “or else” may mean “or else I am going to walk 
away and seek a warrant from an impartial magistrate” (no 
threat, but rather reasonable police conduct). The ambiguity 
here may indicate that, under the proposed test, this is not an 
objectively reasonable threat to violate the Fourth Amendment. 
But if the officer yelled “open up, or else,” and placed a door-
breaching ram up against the door, the circumstances may 
make this an objectively viewed threat to violate the Fourth 
Amendment. Such implied threats should be subject to a 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis. 
Although the Court usually expresses a preference for 
bright line rules clearly indicating what type of behavior is 
permissible,130 the rule in King does not accomplish this.131 
  
ground that there was “no evidence that the occupants were aware of the extent of the 
police presence or felt threatened.” Id. at 129. The District Court in Utah even 
appeared to directly address the issue of implied threats when they held that police 
threatened to violate the Fourth Amendment when “they attempted to enter [a hotel] 
room with [a] key card” prior to the exigency. United States v. Estrada, No. 1:11-CR-
101 TS, 2012 WL 2367992, at *6 (D. Utah June 21, 2012).  
 128 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1858 (2011). 
 129 Id.  
 130 See Maclin, supra note 119, at 69-71. Maclin indicates that modern Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence expresses a preference for bright line rules over balancing 
tests, and provides a list of seven cases supporting this proposition. Id.  
 131 An example of a bright line rule is that in Minnesota v. Olson, where the 
Court “held that an overnight guest is entitled to rely on the privacy of his host’s 
home.” Id. at 69 n.98 (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 93 (1989)). This is a 
bright line rule because it provides clear guidance as to the privacy protection afforded 
to an overnight guest. The rule in King is not a bright line rule because it does not 
explicitly state the conduct sufficient to constitute a threat. See King, 131 S. Ct. at 
1861. A bright line rule would thus state an “explicit verbal threat,” not just “threat” 
alone.  
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Therefore, for the sake of “provid[ing] ample protection for the 
privacy rights that the [Fourth] Amendment protects,”132 the 
lower courts should subject any threat—implied or express, 
verbal or non-verbal—to an objective reasonableness review by 
considering the threat under the totality of the circumstances.  
V. THE REASONABLY INTERPRETED THREAT TEST FLOWS 
DIRECTLY FROM FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
AND KENTUCKY V. KING 
The Reasonably Interpreted Threat test draws support 
directly from the Court’s analysis in a long line of Fourth 
Amendment cases on the subject and preserves the goals the 
Court sought to achieve in Kentucky v. King. In addition, the 
Reasonably Interpreted Threat test adequately responds to many 
concerns expressed by the Court regarding the respondent’s 
proposed test in King.133 The lower courts should thus adopt the 
Reasonably Interpreted Threat test when analyzing the 
destruction of evidence exigency and the police-created 
exigency doctrine.  
A. Consistency with Kentucky v. King 
The Reasonably Interpreted Threat test promotes the 
Court’s desire for consistency. The Court in King expressed a 
concern for consistency by basing its inquiry upon the 
justification for warrantless search and seizure in the first 
place: Fourth Amendment reasonableness.134 The Court 
supported its holding by comparing the reasonableness test to 
tests adopted by the Court in other warrantless search and 
seizure scenarios, including, for example, the tests for the 
  
 132 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1862. 
 133 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 134 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1858. 
Despite the welter of tests devised by the lower courts, the answer to the 
question presented in this case follows directly and clearly from the principle 
that permits warrantless searches in the first place. As previously noted, 
warrantless searches are allowed when the circumstances make it 
reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to dispense with 
the warrant requirement. Therefore, the . . . exigent circumstances rule 
justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the 
exigency is reasonable in the same sense.  
Id. at 1857-58. 
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seizure of evidence in plain view135 and consent-based 
encounters.136 Moreover, the Court’s adoption of a purely 
objective standard that ignores subjective state of mind is 
consistent with historical Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.137 
The Reasonably Interpreted Threat test preserves the 
Court’s preference for objective review,138 analyzes the threat 
under the totality of the circumstances,139 and subjects the 
behavior (the alleged threat) to the reasonableness analysis that 
is at the heart of the Fourth Amendment.140 Reasonableness 
“permeates most Fourth Amendment doctrines” and serves as 
the “substantive command of the Fourth Amendment.”141 Fourth 
  
 135 Id. (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136, 140 (1990)) (stating 
police “may seize evidence in plain view, provided that they have not violated the 
Fourth Amendment in arriving at the spot from which the observation of the evidence 
is made”). The Court further indicated that the subjective intent of the officer is 
irrelevant in determining whether the seizure was justified; all that matters is whether 
the officer violated the Fourth Amendment in reaching the location where the evidence 
was seized. Id.  
 136 Id. (citing INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 n.5 (1984)) (stating that an 
officer “may seek consent-based encounters if they are lawfully present in the place 
where the consensual encounter occurs”). For example, if an officer has not violated the 
Fourth Amendment in reaching their location, he or she may seek consensual 
encounters with an individual. Id. The Court further explained that, in such an instance 
where “consent is freely given,” the subjective intent of the officer in approaching the 
individual is irrelevant to a determination of the encounter’s validity. Id.  
 137 Id. at 1859 (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)) (holding that Fourth Amendment case law has 
“repeatedly rejected a subjective approach,” and that a test based on reasonableness is 
generally objective). For arguments in support of an objective standard prior to the 
holding in King, see generally Bryan M. Abramoske, Note, It Doesn’t Matter What They 
Intended: The Need for Objective Permissibility Review of Police-Created Exigencies in 
“Knock and Talk” Investigations, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 561 (2008). 
 138 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1859 (quoting Horton, 496 U.S. at 136, 138) 
(“‘[E]ven-handed law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective 
standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of 
mind of the officer.’”); supra notes 27, 137 and accompanying text. 
 139 Fourth Amendment reasonableness is an objective measure viewed under 
the totality of the circumstances. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996). Analyzing 
the threat under the totality of the circumstances is consistent with the review applied 
to determine the validity of an exigent circumstance: When determining whether the 
exigencies of the situation make a warrantless search objectively reasonable, the courts 
are essentially analyzing whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a legitimate 
exigency was present. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978) (“[W]arrants are 
generally required to search a person’s home or his person unless ‘the exigencies of the 
situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless 
search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting McDonald v. 
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)). 
 140 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 
(2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)) (“[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth 
Amendment is reasonableness.”); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”). 
 141 Raigrodski, supra note 3, at 158. 
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Amendment reasonableness informs warrant requirements,142 
legitimate expectations of privacy,143 the exigent-circumstances 
rule,144 and now, the police-created exigency doctrine.145 As such, 
behavior alleged to constitute a threatened violation of the Fourth 
Amendment should receive the same reasonableness review.146 
Doing so maintains a doctrinal consistency, offering relatively clear 
guidelines for both citizens and law enforcement officers. 
Similar to the Court’s holding in King, the Reasonably 
Interpreted Threat test does not require analysis of the 
“foreseeable” mental response of the occupant of a premises, thus 
reducing the burden on law enforcement officials in the field.147 In 
addition, the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test recognizes that 
a warrantless search may occasionally be justified, even in 
situations where police could have sufficiently demonstrated 
probable cause to obtain a warrant and had time to do so.148 
  
 142 See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (noting that warrantless searches and 
seizures are presumptively unreasonable) (emphasis added); see also Raigrodski, supra 
note 3, at 158. Dr. Raigrodski argues:  
The concept of reasonableness permeates most Fourth Amendment doctrines, 
such as the reasonable expectations of privacy, reasonable suspicion, and 
reasonable person standards. More importantly, reasonableness operates as 
the overarching norm of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment 
does not denounce all searches and seizures, but only those deemed 
unreasonable, and reasonableness is set forth as the ultimate constitutional 
standard. Reasonableness is both the substantive command of the Fourth 
Amendment and its preferred methodology, and is the meta-narrative of 
search and seizure law. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  
 143 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(noting in the concurrence that the heart of a Fourth Amendment analysis in 
determining whether an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy is whether a person 
has a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy” (emphasis added)). 
 144 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1856 (“One well-recognized exception [to the warrant 
requirement] applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law 
enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under 
the Fourth Amendment.” (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978)).  
 145 Id. at 1858 (“[When] . . . the police [do] not create the exigency by engaging 
or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth amendment, warrantless entry 
to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.” (emphasis added)).  
 146 Id. (“[T]he exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when 
the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable . . . .” (emphasis added)); 
see also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (“The touchstone of our 
analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always ‘the reasonableness in all the 
circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’” 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968))). 
 147 See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1860 (recognizing that law enforcement officials are 
placed in scenarios where they must make split-second decisions, and that forcing officials 
to determine the foreseeable responses to their tactics would create great difficulty).  
 148 See id. (recognizing many legitimate reasons why police may not seek a 
warrant as soon as probable cause is established, and providing examples). 
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Therefore, the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test is consistent 
with the Court’s goal of promoting investigative efficiency because 
it does not require police to halt every investigation the very 
instant that they obtain the minimum amount of evidence 
necessary for establishing probable cause,149 a duty found 
nowhere in the Constitution.150 
Moreover, the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test 
provides “ample protection for the privacy rights [guaranteed 
by] . . . the Fourth Amendment” that the holding in Kentucky v. 
King sought to further.151 The Court states that the rule 
announced in King does not in any way reduce an individual’s 
Fourth Amendment privacy rights because when an officer does 
“no more than any private citizen might do” by knocking on a 
door of a premises and requesting to speak with its occupant.152 
In response, “the occupant [would have] no obligation to open 
the door or to speak” because the test applies entirely to the 
conduct of the police and poses no obligation on the occupant.153 
An occupant that does open the door, however, can still deny 
entry or refuse to answer any questions.154 Under the Reasonably 
Interpreted Threat test, then, a mere knock upon a door of a 
premises followed by a request to speak to its occupant would 
not constitute a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment, 
especially under an objective reasonableness standard. By 
contrast, an officer could not follow a knock and request to 
speak by banging on the door and violently screaming “open up 
or else!” Further, the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test still 
enables the exigent circumstances doctrine to survive because a 
warrantless search is still justified when occupants respond to 
lawful police behavior by “attempt[ing] to destroy evidence.”155 
  
 149 Id. at 1860-61 (“[L]aw enforcement officers are under no constitutional 
duty to call a halt to criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum 
evidence to establish probable cause.” (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 
310 (1966) (internal quotation marks omitted))).  
 150 Id. at 1861 (“Faulting the police for failing to apply for a search warrant at 
the earliest possible time after obtaining probable cause imposes a duty that is 
nowhere to be found in the Constitution.”). 
 151 Id. at 1862 (“This holding provides ample protection for the privacy rights 
that the [Fourth] Amendment protects.”). 
 152 Id. (“When law enforcement officers who are not armed with a warrant 
knock on a door, they do no more than any private citizen might do.”).  
 153 Id. (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983)).  
 154 Id.  
 155 Id. (“Occupants who choose not to stand on their constitutional rights but 
instead elect to attempt to destroy evidence have only themselves to blame for the 
warrantless exigent-circumstances search that may ensue.”). 
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B. Consistency with Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
The Reasonably Interpreted Threat test comports with 
the Court’s analysis of Fourth Amendment issues outside the 
context of Kentucky v. King. In particular, recognition of both 
explicit and implicit threatened violations remains consistent 
with the Court’s similar understanding that Fourth Amendment 
violations can arise both through physical and constructive 
means.156 For instance, police can conduct a search either by 
physically entering a home or by “constructively” searching it 
through the use of technology.157 Any warrantless search that 
violates that is unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment, 
irrespective of the means employed by law enforcement in doing 
so.158 Similarly, a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment does 
not become less of a threat simply because it is implied rather 
than explicitly stated.  
In addition, recognition of both explicit and implied 
threats parallels the Supreme Court’s analysis in determining 
whether an individual has freely consented to a police search.159 
When analyzing the validity of consent, a court must determine 
whether the consent was the product of coercion by law 
enforcement.160 A court must make this determination by 
assessing the totality of the circumstances.161 Under the totality 
approach, “consent must not be coerced, by explicit or implicit 
  
 156 See supra Part. IV.A.  
 157 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(“[R]easonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by electronic as well as physical 
invasion.”); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“Where, as here, the 
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the 
home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the 
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”). 
 158 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961). The 
determination of whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation “is based upon the 
reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,” not the type of 
surveillance microphones used to intrude. Id.; see also Kerr, supra note 33, at 804. Kerr 
indicates that the concern of technologies impact on privacy rights dates back to 1928 
when Justice Brandeis declared that “every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government 
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 159 Consent to search has been recognized by the Court as a valid exception to 
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559-
60 (2004). 
 160 In order for consent to a search to be valid, it must be voluntarily given. 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) (stating that the Fourth 
Amendment “require[s] that a consent not be coerced”).  
 161 Id. at 229 (noting that the Court will “examine all the surrounding 
circumstances to determine” the voluntariness of consent).  
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means, [or] by implied threat or covert force”162 because any 
coercion, “no matter how subtl[e],” would result in unjustified police 
intrusion in violation of the Fourth Amendment.163 The Reasonably 
Interpreted Threat test follows from the same reasoning because 
an entry gained by a threatened Fourth Amendment violation, 
whether explicit or implicit, would still result in an unreasonable 
police intrusion that violates the Fourth Amendment.164 
C. Concerns From the Respondent’s Proposed Test  
The respondent’s proposed test contained a 
reasonableness element that appeared to account for implied 
threats.165 Although the Court was unwilling to accept this 
particular formulation, this does not suggest that the Court 
intended to create a blanket exception rejecting all implied 
threats. On the surface, the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test 
may appear similar to the test proposed by the respondent, given 
that both focus on the question of reasonableness. However, upon 
closer inspection, crucial differences exist that render the 
Reasonably Interpreted Threat test starkly different from 
respondent’s test, while remaining consistent with the Court’s 
holding in Kentucky v. King. 
The respondent’s test contained a component of 
foreseeability that the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test does 
not. The foreseeability component troubled the Court because 
the test emphasized reasonableness both with respect to the 
conduct of the police and the foreseeable mental effect of that 
conduct on the occupant.166 A critical issue arises with the 
foreseeability component because Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness analysis focuses solely on the conduct of the 
government, not the “foreseeable” mental response of the 
  
 162 Id. at 228.  
 163 Id.  
 164 The Court in Schneckloth based part of its reasoning on the belief that the 
Court should protect against even subtle intrusions on constitutional protections. Id. at 
228-29 (“[I]llegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing . . . by silent 
approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. . . . It is the duty of 
courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any 
stealthy encroachments thereon.” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 
(1886) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 165 See supra note 103. 
 166 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1861 (2011). The respondent’s test 
asked whether a reasonable person would believe entry to be “imminent and 
inevitable,” thus placing the focus of the analysis on what a reasonable occupant would 
foresee the police doing. Id. The Court has already expressed discontent with adopting 
a foreseeability component because of the potential for unpredictability. Id. at 1859. 
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respondent.167 Contrary to the respondent’s proposed test, the 
Reasonably Interpreted Threat test focuses solely on the 
conduct of law enforcement, paying no attention to what a 
reasonable person would believe the police are actually about 
to do.168 Therefore, the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test does 
not require the courts to assume the daunting and unpractical 
task of attempting to gauge foreseeability,169 thus avoiding the 
“unacceptable degree of unpredictability”170 that plagued the 
respondent’s proposed test.  
In addition to the fatal foreseeability requirement, the 
respondent’s test failed because of the insufficiency of the 
factors it considered when determining whether a reasonable 
person would believe entry was imminent and inevitable.171 As 
such, the test did not fail because of any sort of disagreement 
that the Court may have held with the application of implied 
threats.172 The Court believed that any need to consider the tone 
of voice and forcefulness of knocks would place a great  burden 
on both law enforcement and the lower courts.173 Along those 
lines, the Court stated that “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not 
require [such a] nebulous and impractical test.”174 However, 
under the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test, a police officer 
could bang on a door as loud as possible, screaming “Police! 
Police!” without necessarily violating the Fourth Amendment 
because, viewed alone, this conduct would not constitute a 
threat.  
Because the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test applies 
a totality of the circumstances approach, the courts could at 
times consider tone of voice and forcefulness of knocks even 
  
 167 The Fourth Amendment protects only against unreasonable searches and 
seizures conducted by the government, not private individuals. See supra note 112. In 
addition, the Court in King recognized that, when determining whether the exigent 
circumstance rule applies, attention must be paid to the reasonableness of the police 
conduct preceding the exigency. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1858.  
 168 The focus on the reasonableness of police conduct alone is consistent with 
the Court’s holding in King. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1858 (“[T]he exigent circumstances rule 
justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is 
reasonable in the same sense.” (emphasis added)).  
 169 See id. at 1859-60 (providing examples illustrating the difficulty of such a task). 
 170 Id. at 1859.  
 171 See id. at 1861. 
 172 The Court noted that if it had adopted the respondent’s test, it would 
create difficulty for law enforcement and the lower courts; however, the Court did not say 
that implied threats in general are insufficient to violate the Fourth Amendment. Id.  
 173 Id. (noting how respondent’s test would propose difficulty for law 
enforcement in determining how loud they may announce their presence, and for the 
courts in determining whether or not such a threshold has been passed).  
 174 Id.  
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though this conduct would not be viewed as a threat on its own. 
Such conduct would play into a court’s analysis under the 
Reasonably Interpreted Threat test, particularly when 
accompanied by a vague statement (“open up or you will regret 
it”175) or a suggestive act (placing lock pick in the cylinder of the 
door176). This is true because a vague statement or suggestive action 
could very well reasonably assert a threat to engage in conduct 
that would violate the Fourth Amendment because both would 
indicate an officer’s intent to open the door in the absence of 
consent by the suspect. In contrast to the respondent’s 
proposed test, the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test analyzes 
only whether a reasonable person would reasonably interpret 
the police conduct to threated a Fourth Amendment violation. 
Because reasonableness analysis stands as “the touchstone of 
the Fourth Amendment,”177 this test is thus far from “nebulous 
and impractical.”  
D. Examples to Provide Guidance 
The chart below provides some examples of how police 
conduct could be analyzed under the Reasonably Interpreted 
Threat test. These examples demonstrate the spectrum of 
actions that lie between the “no threat” and “explicit threat” 
categories.178 The Reasonably Interpreted Threat test would 
provide a principled framework for analyzing this middle 
ground police behavior. 
 
  
 175 Other examples of such vague verbal expressions include statements like 
“open up, or else,” and “open up, this is your last chance.” Note how these statements 
are inherently different from simply announcing police presence, or requesting to speak 
with the occupant. The statements suggest that some action may be taken if the 
occupant does not comply, such as breaking down the door. Therefore, while the 
statements may not explicitly contain a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment (such 
as “open up or I will kick the door in”)—because the former statements can be construed 
to mean “open up, or else we will get a warrant”—they may have the same effect by 
reasonably asserting an impermissible threat under the totality of the circumstances.  
 176 Other examples of such suggestive actions could include lining up a door 
ram, or cocking back the action of a shotgun with a door-breaching muzzle attached. 
Similar to vague verbal expressions, these actions suggest that some action, such as 
breaching the door, may be taken if the occupant does not comply.  
 177 See supra note 140. 
 178 Note, however, that this is not an exhaustive list; rather, this list simply 
contains several examples of a potentially limitless set of facts.  
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CONCLUSION 
The Reasonably Interpreted Threat test will, 
concededly, place a small requirement on law enforcement to 
think a little deeper about their actions and word choice before 
approaching a home. This slight burden on law enforcement, 
however, does not present a legitimate reason to abandon an 
objective reasonableness requirement.179 While it would be 
  
 179 The privacy protections granted by the Fourth Amendment “may not be 
totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal 
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easier to interpret the Court’s holding as establishing a bright-
line rule classifying only explicit verbal statements as threats, 
the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, 
not pure simplicity. The Reasonably Interpreted Threat test 
does not aim to take the easy way out, but instead seeks to 
achieve the best possible balance between constitutionally 
protected privacy rights and investigative efficiency. Making 
minor adaptations to investigative procedure can mitigate this 
slight burden. For example, states can draft department-wide 
policies prohibiting certain vague verbal expressions or conduct 
that expresses a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment when 
approaching a home. The now-or-never scenarios encountered 
by law enforcement may require police to make split-second 
decisions.180 But these decisions still must be made rationally 
and in accordance with the protections afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment and the police-created exigency doctrine. Using 
the framework of the Reasonably Interpreted Threat test, law 
enforcement can adopt guidelines and procedural requirements 
without having to guess what might constitute an 
impermissible threat.181 The proposed test permits actions that 
law enforcement may have good reason to take182 while 
forbidding actions that amount to threats to go beyond the 
constitutional limits of the police-created exigency doctrine and 
the Fourth Amendment.  
Christopher LoGalbo† 
  
law.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978). “[T]he mere fact that law 
enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the 
Fourth Amendment.” Id. 
 180 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1860 (recognizing that law enforcement officials are 
often placed in scenarios where they must “make split-second judgments—in 
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” (citing Graham v. 
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)). 
 181 Law enforcement can instruct against the use of certain verbal or physical 
assertions reasonably interpreted as a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment, such 
as a ban on the use of ambiguous demands like “open up or else” or the placement of a 
battering ram at the door of an individual’s home. 
 182 King, 131 S. Ct. at 1861 (noting that law enforcement “may have a very 
good reason” to knock loudly and to identify themselves to citizens).  
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